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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Only the Supreme Court Can
Determine Whether the Death Sentence Would be
Excessive or Disproportionate: State v. Wyrostek
1. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Wyrostek,l the New Mexico Supreme Court held that it
alone can determine whether a death sentence is excessive or dispropor-
tionate.2 The issue, one of first impression in New Mexico,3 arose after
a district court ruled in a pre-trial order that the death penalty would
be excessive or disproportionate when compared to the penalty imposed
in similar cases. 4
By prohibiting the district court from conducting proportionality re-
views, Wyrostek denies defendants one method of evading the death
penalty. After Wyrostek, only the supreme court can decide if the death
penalty is proportionate. This decision, a simple matter of criminal
procedure, has a profound impact on the law.
This Note will give an overview of the issue in other jurisdictions,
review the facts and procedural history of State v. Wyrostek, examine
the court's rationale and policy considerations, and explore the impli-
cations of the decision.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A grand jury indicted Vance Wyrostek for first-degree murder, con-
spiracy to commit first-degree murder, aggravated battery, and tampering
with evidence.' Before the grand jury, the State alleged that Wyrostek
was having a party in his home when Francisco Gomez made several
sexual comments about Wyrostek's sister. In response, Wyrostek and his
brother beat Gomez unconscious. Wyrostek, his brother, and Larry Lyan-
1. 117 N.M. 514, 873 P.2d 260 (1994).
2. Id. at 516, 873 P.2d at 262.
3. Id. at 519, 873 P.2d at 264.
4. Id. at 517, 873 P.2d at 263. The New Mexico Supreme Court has set out the following
guidelines for proportionality review:
1. We will review this issue only when raised on appeal.
2. In our review, we will consider only New Mexico cases in which a defendant
has been convicted of capital murder under the same aggravating circumstance(s).
3. Only those New Mexico cases in which a defendant was convicted under the
same aggravating circumstance(s) and then received either the death penalty or life
imprisonment and whose conviction and sentence have been upheld previously by
this Court, will be considered appropriate for comparison.
4. We will review the record and compare the facts of the offense and all other
evidence presented by way of aggravation or mitigation to determine whether the
sentence is excessive or disproportionate.
State v. Garcia, 99 N.M. 771, 780, 664 P.2d 969, 978 (N.M.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2464 (1983)
(footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
5. Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent factual and procedural references refer to Wyrostek,
117 N.M. at 516-17, 873 P.2d at 262-63.
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nas then loaded Gomez into a pick up truck, drove away from the house,
and dumped him in a ditch. Thereafter, Wyrostek drove himself and
Larry Lyannas to a convenience store where they purchased gasoline.
They returned to the ditch, and Lyannas poured gasoline over the still
unconscious victim. Wyrostek lit a stick and threw it on the victim.
Gomez died as a result of thermal burns to his body.
Alleging that Gomez was a witness to his own beating and that Wyrostek
killed him to prevent him from reporting the beating, the State -sought
the death penalty. 6 The grand jury found probable cause for the State's
allegations, and indicted Wyrostek. The indictment charged that Gomez
had been "a witness to a crime or any person likely to become a witness
to a crime, [and was killed] for the purpose of preventing report of the
crime or testimony in any criminal proceeding." ' 7 Before trial, Wyrostek
moved for an order prohibiting the State from seeking the death penalty.8
The district court held that it had the discretion to decide the issue of
proportionality and concluded that a death sentence would be excessive
or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar capital murder cases
in New Mexico.9 The State sought interlocutory appeal of the issue to
the Court of Appeals.' 0 The Court of Appeals certified the issue to the
New Mexico Supreme Court."
III. HISTORY OF THE ISSUE AND ITS TREATMENT IN
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
In Pulley v. Harris,2 the United States Supreme Court held that the
federal Constitution does not require states to perform a comparative
proportionality review in death penalty cases. 3 Some states choose not
6. Id.; see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-5 (Repi. Pamp. 1994) which states:
The aggravating circumstances to be considered by the sentencing court or jury
pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-20A-2 NMSA 1978 are limited to the
following:
[A-F]
G. the capital felony was murder of a witness to a crime or any person likely
to become a witness to a crime, for the purpose of preventing report of the crime
or testimony in any criminal proceeding, or for retaliation for the victim having
testified in any criminal proceeding.
7. Wyrostek, 117 N.M. at 517, 873 P.2d at 263.
8. Id. Defendant based his argument on N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4 (Cum. Supp. 1994)
which directs the Supreme Court to perform a proportionality review in death penalty cases and
on State v. Clark, 108 N.M. 288, 772 P.2d 322 (N.M.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 923 (1989), overruled
on other grounds, State v. Henderson, 109 N.M. 655, 664, 789 P.2d 603, 612 (1990).
9. Wyrostek, 117 N.M. at 517, 873 P.2d at 263.
10. Id. The trial court certified the matter for interlocutory appeal because it found that the-
decision involved "a controlling question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for
difference of opinion, and that an immediate appeal from the order or decision may materially
advance the ultimate termination of this litigation." District Court Order at 7, State v. Wyrostek,
117 N.M. 514, 873 P.2d 260 (N.M. 1994) (No. 20,696). See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-14(B) (Repl.
Pamp. 1990) (setting out the supreme court's jurisdiction to review by writ or certiorari).
11. Wyrostek, 117 N.M. at 517, 873 P.2d at 263.
12. 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
13. Id. at 43-44.
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to perform such a review. 14 In the states that do perform a comparative
proportionality review, very few have explicitly addressed the issue of
whether courts other than the supreme court may conduct such reviews.
One state that has considered the question, North Carolina, held that
only its supreme court can conduct a proportionality review of a death
sentence. 5 In other states, there is no case law on the issue of whether
the trial court can conduct proportionality reviews, but state statutes
seem to indicate that the supreme court is to perform the review.'
6
At least one state has a statute that specifically directs the trial court
to conduct a proportionality review. 7 Under the Nebraska statute, both
the trial court and the supreme court are to conduct proportionality
reviews.18
The Kentucky Supreme Court has addressed the issue, but the decision
is open to various interpretations. In McClellan v. Commonwealth of
Kentucky,' 9 the court held that the supreme court is required by statute
to perform a proportionality review, but that "a trial judge is not required
to conduct a proportionality review. ' '20 The Wyrostek court interpreted
this holding to mean that a Kentucky trial court may, at its discretion,
be able to conduct a proportionality review. 2' While this is one possible
interpretation, other language in McClellan hints that the Kentucky court
intended that the trial court could not conduct such reviews.
22
14. See, e.g., WYo. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-103(d)(iii) (repealed 1989); State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d
1232, 1249 (Utah), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 476 (1993) (finding that the courts would not make a
comparison of the facts and circumstances of capital cases on a case-by-case basis); Berget v.
Oklahoma, 824 P.2d 364, 377 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 124 (1992) (finding that
the failure of the court to provide a proportionality review does not violate the United States
Constitution.) Oklahoma had a statutorily mandated proportionality review, OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit.
21, § 701.12(c)(3) (repealed 1985).
15. State v. Jackson, 305 S.E.2d 703, 716 n.3 (N.C. 1983). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)
(1994 Cum. Supp.) is very similar in content to N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4 (1994 Cum. Supp.).
The North Carolina statute states in pertinent part:
(1) The judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic
review by the Supreme Court of North Carolina ....
(2) The sentence of death shall be overturned and a sentence of life imprisonment
imposed in lieu thereof by the Supreme Court upon a finding that the record does
not support the jury's findings of any aggravating circumstance or circumstances
upon which the sentencing court based its sentence of death, or upon a finding
that the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice,
or any other arbitrary factor, or upon a finding that the sentence of death is
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering
both the crime and the defendant ....
N.C. GEN. STAT § 15A-2000(d) (1994 Cum. Supp.).
16. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-105 (Supp. 1994); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §10.95.130
(West 1995); Reddix v. Mississippi, 547 So. 2d 792 (Miss. 1989); State v. Benn, 845 P.2d 289
(Wash.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 382 (1993).
17. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522 (1989).
18. Id. §§ 29-2521.01 to 29-2522.
19. 715 S.W.2d 464 (Ky. 1986).
20. Id. at 472-73 (emphasis added).
21. State v. Wyrostek, 117 N.M. 514, 520 n.5, 873 P.2d 260, 266 n.5 (1994).
22. After stating that a trial judge is not required to conduct a proportionality review, the court
stated, "That review will be conducted by the Supreme Court in the event the death penalty is
imposed." McClellan, 715 S.W.2d at 473.
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IV. RATIONALE OF THE COURT
Before Wyrostek, no lower court had ever challenged the supreme
court's exclusive right to make death penalty proportionality determi-
nations. 23 The supreme court had consistently made all proportionality
determinations in death sentence cases in New Mexico. 24
The Wyrostek court relied on the New Mexico Constitution and stat-
utory construction in deciding that it alone could perform proportionality
reviews. The court then examined and rejected several of Wyrostek's
policy arguments.
A. New Mexico Constitution: The Supreme Court Shall Review
Death Penalty Appeals
The court first examined the New Mexico Constitution to determine
whether district courts have the power to determine when a death sentence
would be disproportionate. 2 Under the constitution, district courts are
courts of general jurisdiction, 26 and have sole and exclusive jurisdiction
to try felony cases. 27 The constitution also grants the supreme court
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over district court judgments that impose
a sentence of death or life imprisonment. 2 The issue, as framed by the
court, was whether the supreme court's exclusive jurisdiction over death
penalty appeals prohibits the district courts from making proportionality
determinations. 29 The court reasoned that, without constitutional prohi-
bition, the proportionality determination presumably falls within the dis-
trict courts' general jurisdiction and can be decided during the trial of
capital murder cases.30 Despite framing the issue in this way, the court
never explicitly reached a conclusion regarding the constitutional issue
raised by the differing grants of jurisdiction. Instead, the court relied
on state statutes regarding sentencing.
B. Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court Shall Rule on the
Validity of the Death Sentence
The Wyrostek court determined that, under the Capital Felony Sen-
tencing Act (Act),31 the supreme court alone can determine proportionality.
23. See id.; see also State v. Compton, 104 N.M. 683, 692, 726 P.2d 837, 846 (1986); State v.
Guzman, 100 N.M. 756, 762, 676 P.2d 1321, 1327 (1984); and State v. Cheadle, 101 N.M. 282,
289, 681 P.2d 708, 715 (1983).
24. See supra note 23.
25. Wyrostek, 117 N.M. at 518, 873 P.2d at 264. The court did agree with Wyrostek that the
issue was of constitutional importance and should be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Id.; see supra
note 12.
26. N.M. CoNsT. art. IV, § 13 reads: "The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all
matters and causes not excepted by this constitution, and [granting other jurisdiction to the district
court]." Trujillo v. State, 79 N.M. 618, 619, 447 P.2d 279, 280 (1968).
27. State v. Garcia, 93 N.M. 51, 53, 596 P.2d 264, 266 (1979).
28. N.M. CoNsT. art. VI, § 2 states in part, "Appeals from a judgment of the district court
imposing a sentence of death or life imprisonment shall be taken directly to the supreme court."
29. Wyrostek, 117 N.M. at 518, 873 P.2d at 264.
30. Id.
31. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-20A-1 to 31-20A-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1994), which reads in pertinent
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In reaching this conclusion, the court considered four main questions:
(1) Is the Act directed toward actors other than the supreme court?; (2)
Can an effective review be completed before the completion of the trial
and sentencing?; (3) Do the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
provisions of the Act indicate that proportionality review should be
performed by the district courts?; and (4) Does a defendant waive his
right to appeal the death sentence based on disproportionality if he does
not raise the issue at trial?32 The court answered all of these questions
in the negative. 33
The court determined that the plain meaning of the Act, read as a
whole, is that only the New Mexico Supreme Court can determine whether
a death sentence is disproportionate.14 The court based this decision on
section 31-20A-4 of the Act,35 which states in part that the death penalty
shall not be imposed if "the sentence of death is excessive or dispro-
portionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the
crime and the defendant. ' 36 The court reasoned that, by directing this
section of the Act toward the supreme court, and not the district courts,
the Legislature intended only the supreme court to make the determination
as to proportionality.3 7
Second, the Wyrostek court reasoned that an effective review of the
appropriateness of a death penalty sentence, including proportionality,
can only be performed after the conclusion of the trial, including the
part:
31-20A-4. Review of judgment and sentence.
A. The judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be automatically
reviewed by the supreme court of the state of New Mexico.
B. In addition to the other matters on appeal, the supreme court shall rule on
the validity of the death sentence.
C. The death penalty shall not be imposed if:
(1) the evidence does not support the finding of a statutory aggravating
circumstance;
(2) the evidence supports a finding that the mitigating circumstances outweigh
the aggravating circumstances;
(3) the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice
or any other arbitrary factor; or
(4) the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed
in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant (emphasis added).
The Act controls the imposition and review of capital punishment in New Mexico. Wyrostek,
117 N.M. at 518, 873 P.2d at 264.
32. Wyrostek, 117 N.M. at 518-522, 873 P.2d at 264-268.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 519, 873 P.2d at 264.
35. See supra note 31.
36. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4(c)(4) (Repl. Pamp. 1994); see supra note 31.
37. The first sentence of N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4 (Cum. Supp. 1994) reads: "The judgment
of conviction and sentence of death shall be automatically reviewed by the supreme court of the
state of New Mexico." See also Wyrostek, 117 N.M. at 519-21, 873 P.2d at 265-67. Wyrostek and
the New Mexico Public Defenders Office (Amicus) argued that the statute simply states that "the
death penalty shall not be imposed if: (1)-(4)" and that all state actors and citizens (including the
district courts) have the duty to obey all state statutes. The court found that this argument did
not take into account that the pertinent section of the statute was directed only to the supreme
court and not to the district courts or the citizens of the state. Wyrostek at 519-21, 873 P.2d at
265-67.
Winter 19951
NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW
sentencing phase.3" The court stated that the determination of whether
a death sentence is excessive or disproportionate requires a review of all
the facts in the trial record. 9 Such a decision cannot be decided before
the completion of the trial and sentencing. 4° The court concluded that
the supreme court, with its exclusive appellate jurisdiction of death penalty
sentences, is the only appropriate forum for proportionality determina-
tion. 4'
Third, the court rejected Wyrostek's argument that the Act's provisions
on aggravating and mitigating circumstances indicate that the propor-
tionality review should be conducted by the district courts.4 2 The court
noted that the Act contains specific provisions that require the trial court
to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances during the sentencing
phase of a capital murder trial.43 On appeal, the supreme court is directed
by statute to review the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stance presented at trial. 44 The supreme court is not to impose the death
penalty if "the evidence does not support the finding of a statutory
aggravating circumstance" or if "the evidence supports a finding that
the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances. '45
The Wyrostek court reasoned that the proportionality review is not to
be conducted in the same manner as the aggravating/mitigating factor
review because the statutory scheme for the proportionality review is
quite different." The Act neither directs the district courts to consider
proportionality, nor requires that the supreme court review evidence of
disproportionality presented at trial. The court stated that it will not
read language into the Act that is not there. 4 Thus, it refused to adopt
38. Wyrostek, 117 N.M. at 519, 873 P.2d at 265.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. The court's reasoning does not appear to take into account the fact that the guilt or innocence
of the defendant is also a question of fact and that the district court has the ability to grant a
directed verdict if the evidence most favorable to the State would not allow the State to prevail.
It could be similarly argued that if the evidence most favorable to the State would not allow a
finding that the death sentence would be proportionate in a given case that the district court could
order that the death penalty not be sought.
42. Wyrostek, 117 N.M. at 520, 873 P.2d at 266.
43. Id.; see N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-20A-2, which reads:
31-20A-2. Determination of Sentence
A. Capital sentencing deliberations shall be guided by the following considerations:
(1) whether aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in Section 6 [31-
20A-5 NMSA 1978] of this act;
(2) whether mitigating circumstances exist as enumerated in Section 7 [31-
20A-6 NMSA 1978] of this act; and
(3) whether other mitigating circumstances exist.
B. After weighing the aggravating circumstances and the mitigating circumstances,
weighing them against each other, and considering both the defendant and the
crime, the jury or judge shall determine whether the defendant should be sentenced
to death or life imprisonment.
44. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
45. Id.
46. Wyrostek, 117 N.M. at 520, 873 P.2d at 267.
47. Id.; see N.M. STAT. ANN. 31-20A-1 to 31-20A-6 (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
48. Wyrostek, 117 N.M. at 520, 873 P.2d at 266.
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an interpretation of the Act that allows the trial court to determine
proportionality and the supreme court to review the evidence of pro-
portionality which was presented at trial.
4 9
Finally, the court rejected Wyrostek's argument that prior decisions
of the New Mexico Supreme Court hold that a defendant waives the
right to appeal a death sentence as disproportionate if the issue is not
raised at trial.50 In State v. Clark,"' the court refused to address the
issue of proportionality because it found that the defendant did not raise
the issue on appeal.5 2 Wyrostek argued that Clark meant that propor-
tionality needed to be raised at the district court in order to preserve
the issue for appeal." The court disagreed with Wyrostek's interpretation
of Clark, stating that Clark stands only for the proposition that pro-
portionality must be raised on appeal in order to be considered.
5 4
C. Policy Considerations: The Supreme Court is the Best Authority
to Conduct Proportionality Reviews
Wyrostek raised two major policy considerations. First, he contended
that allowing the district court to make a pretrial ruling on proportionality
would save the expense and delay caused by trying a death penalty case
when the death penalty would be clearly excessive or disproportionate. 5
He also argued that a pretrial ruling would prevent possible unfairness.
6
The court found, however, that the proportionality review is not meant
to be concerned with the fairness of the trial process.5 7 Rather, "the
proportionality review is a post-sentence inquiry, undertaken to identify
disparities in capital sentencing and to prevent the death penalty from
being administered in an arbitrary, capricious, or freakish manner.""
Because the purpose of the review is to avoid the arbitrary administration
of the death penalty, the court reasoned that the supreme court is the
49. Id.
50. Id. at 521, 873 P.2d at 267.
51. 108 N.M. 288, 772 P.2d 322, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 923 (1989), overruled on other grounds,
State v. Henderson, 109 N.M. 655, 664, 789 P.2d 603, 612 (1990). Although it appears strange
that the defendant would try to argue the waiver of proportionality review, Wyrostek argued that
"if the proportionality of a death sentence must be raised at trial to be preserved on appeal, the
district court has the authority to decide the issue." Id. Therefore, Wyrostek made this facially
contradictory argument in order to have the district court determine proportionality.
52. Id. at 311, 772 P.2d at 335, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 923 (1989), overruled on other grounds,
State v. Henderson, 109 N.M. 655, 664, 789 P.2d 603, 612 (1990). In Clark, the court found that
the defendant did not allege that the death penalty was disproportionate in his case, but rather
argued that the guidelines for proportionality reviews set out in State v. Garcia, 99 N.M. 771, 664
P.2d 969, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2464 (1983) were unduly restrictive and should be broadened.
Clark. at 311, 772 P.2d at 325. For the guidelines set out in Garcia, see supra note 4.
53. State v. Wyrostek, 117 N.M. 514, 521, 873 P.2d 260, 267 (1994). The district court agreed
with Wyrostek's interpretation of Clark and thus found that it had the discretion to determine
proportionality. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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best authority to conduct such a review.5 9 The court quoted the United
States Supreme Court's statement that the purpose of the proportionality
review was best achieved when "a court of statewide jurisdiction ...
conduct(s) comparisons between death sentences imposed by different
judges or juries within the State." 6
Second, Wyrostek claimed that when district courts are prohibited from
declaring the death penalty disproportionate, the prosecutor may seek
the death penalty in a clearly disproportionate case in order to (1) obtain
a conviction-prone jury, 6' (2) eliminate jurors on racial and religious
grounds, 62 and (3) use the threat of a death sentence for leverage in plea
bargaining. 63 The Wyrostek court, however, held that since Wyrostek did
not allege any of the above acts of prosecutorial misconduct, the court
would not consider those issues. 64
V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
A. Analysis of the Court's Decision
While the court correctly construed the Capital Sentencing Felony Act
and prior New Mexico case law, it failed to make a thoughtful inquiry
into the constitutionality of allowing only the New Mexico Supreme Court
to make determinations as to the proportionality of the death sentence
in a given case. The court merely set out the different grants of jurisdiction
that the constitution gives to the district and supreme courts. 65
After stating that the constitution does not expressly deny the district
court from conducting proportionality reviews, the court immediately
turned to the Capital Sentencing Act, 66 stating that the jurisdictional issue
was to be "answered by construing the Act in accordance with the rules
of statutory interpretation. ' 67 The court's reasoning is faulty. Statutes
are generally interpreted in accordance with the constitution; the con-
stitution is not interpreted in accordance with statutes. Without a more
thorough constitutional analysis, the court's rationale is unfinished and
the constitutional issue remains unresolved.
59. Id. at 523, 873 P.2d at 269.
60. Id. (citing Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 70-71 (1984)).
61. A jury for a capital murder trial must be "death qualified,' which Wyrostek contended
makes the jury more conviction-prone. Defendant-Appellee's Answer Brief at 10, State v. Wyrostek,
117 N.M. 514, 873 P.2d 260 (1994) (No. 20,696).
62. Wyrostek contended that being able to dismiss jurors because of their opposition to the
death penalty is racially and religiously discriminatory because the largest segments of the population
opposed to the death penalty are Catholics and Hispanics, but he offered no statistics or studies
which support his contention. Defendant-Appellee's Answer Brief at 7, State v. Wyrostek, 117 N.M.
514, 873 P.2d 260 (1994) (No. 20,696).
63. Wyrostek, 117 N.M. at 522, 873 P.2d at 268.
64. Id. Nevertheless, the court went on to comment that there is an established pretrial procedure
for evaluating aggravating circumstances and that this procedure both ensures fairer trials for
defendants and conserves judicial resources. Id.
65. Id. at 518, 873 P.2d at 264.
66. Id.; see supra note 31.
67. Id.
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Had the court done a more thorough constitutional analysis, it is likely
that it would have found that the constitution does not prohibit district
courts from making proportionality determinations. The constitutional
provision that grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction over death sentence
cases to the supreme court says nothing about what the district court
can do during a trial. 6 The provision simply states that appeals from
district court judgments imposing the death penalty shall go directly to
the supreme court, thus bypassing the court of appeals. 69 The court made
no attempt to explain how this provision could be interpreted to limit
the district courts' sole and exclusive jurisdiction to try felony cases,70
including the making of determinations as to proportionality. 7'
B. Implications of the Court's Decision
After Wyrostek, it is more difficult for a defendant to escape the death
penalty in New Mexico. 72 Defendants cannot argue at trial that the death
penalty would be excessive or disproportionate in their cases. Defendants
have only one state forum in which to make such an argument: the New
Mexico Supreme Court. If they lose at the supreme court, they have
nowhere in the state system to appeal the decision.73 Furthermore, de-
fendants are effectively denied the ability to apply for a writ of habeas
corpus in federal court or to petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court on the issue of proportionality. Since the Supreme Court
has said that there is no constitutional right to a comparative propor-
tionality review, 74 it is very unlikely that federal courts would consider
a writ for habeas corpus75 or a petition for certiorari on this issue.
76
68. See supra note 28.
69. Id.
70. State v. Garcia, 93 N.M. 51, 53, 596 P.2d 264, 266 (1979) states that "Ju]nder the New Mexico
Constitution, sole and exclusive jurisdiction for the trial of felony cases is in the district courts."
71. The proportionality determination should not be distinguished from other matters on which
district courts routinely rule as part of their authority to try felony cases. For instance, the district
courts have the authority to rule that, as a matter of law, the state has failed to present sufficient
evidence to submit a factual issue to a jury, and so to direct a verdict of acquittal on any or all
charges. N.M. R. CRIM. PRO. 5-607(K). Allowing the district court to make proportionality deter-
minations would not grant the district courts a substantially different type of power; both have to
do with the trial (not the appeal) of a case before the court.
72. It will probably be theoretically harder for defendants to escape the death penalty for the
reasons explained above. However, different factors, including the composition of the district courts
and the supreme court, may at times be such that the different courts would come to substantially
the same determinations as to proportionality. Therefore, a defendant's chances to evade the death
penalty may not be significantly lowered by having only the supreme court make the determination.
73. Although New Mexico has a statute providing for a writ of habeas corpus, a person is only
entitled to the writ if his or her imprisonment or restraint is unlawful. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-1-
1 (1978 Pamp.). Therefore, if the New Mexico Supreme Court (on appeal) has said that the death
penalty is not disproportionate in a given case, it is almost inconceivable that the same court would
then find the defendant's imprisonment unlawful under the issue of proportionality. Thus, while
the provision for a writ of habeas corpus exists, it is essentially denied to defendants arguing that
the imposition of the death sentence was disproportionate in their cases.
74. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1984).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988) requires a contention that the person applying for a writ of
habeas corpus is in custody in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1988) states that:
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Wyrostek's policy arguments" highlight other implications of this de-
cision. For instance, death penalty cases take more time and money to
try than non-death penalty cases. 7 The New Mexico Supreme Court itself
has recognized that death penalty prosecutions are qualitatively and quan-
titatively distinct from other criminal proceedings and that capital felony
prosecutions and sentencing require extra judicial resources.7 9 The extra
time and money needed for a death sentence case imposes a strain on
both the State and the defendant.8 0 It is a waste of the taxpayers' money
to expend large amounts trying death penalty cases if they will be
overturned on appeal. Likewise, it is harmful to defendants to have to
defend against a death penalty charge when such a sentence is clearly
disproportionate. An Amicus Curiae brief by the New Mexico Public
Defender Department filed in Wyrostek points out that the defendant in
a death penalty case is harmed by at least three factors: (1) the additional
cost and relative scarcity of defense counsel in death penalty cases; (2)
the additional publicity connected with a death penalty case; and, (3)
the possibility that "death qualified" juries are more conviction-prone.,
If the district court cannot determine that the death penalty would be
disproportionate, the court has little or no way in which to screen or
prevent a death penalty trial, even if the death penalty could not legally
be imposed. Thus, all of the difficulties involved in a death penalty case
are present with no benefit to be gained by their presence (because the
death penalty must be overturned on appeal as disproportionate). This
situation is exacerbated by the fact that the grand jury need not find
probable cause of aggravating circumstances in order for the State to
seek the death penalty. 2
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a
decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari
where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in question
or where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground
of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States,
or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under
the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority
exercised under, the United States.
Since the Supreme Court has already found that there is no constitutional right to a comparative
proportionality review, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would rule that a claim that the death
penalty was disproportionate is included in the jurisdiction described in the above statute.
77. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
78. See Wyrostek, 117 N.M. at 522, 873 P.2d at 268.
79. State v. Ogden, 118 N.M. 234, 239, 880 P.2d 845, 850, cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 336 (1994).
The case also states that capital prosecutions are uniquely complex and demanding because
[m]ore skilled and experienced prosecutors and defenders are required: extensive
investigation into the defendant's background for proof of mitigating circumstances
must be done, and there will be a proliferation of pretrial motions, applications,
and hearings, consuming significantly more judicial resources than non-capital pro-
secutions.
Id. (citations omitted).
80. See Amicus Curiae Brief-New Mexico Public Defender Department at 17-18, State v.
Wyrostek, 117 N.M. 514, 873 P.2d 260 (1994) (No. 20,696).
81. Id. at 16-18.
82. State v. Morton, 107 N.M. 478, 481, 760 P.2d 170, 173 (Ct. App. 1988); but see State v.
Ogden, 118 N.M. 234, 880 P.2d 845, cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 336 (1994) which holds that, upon
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Furthermore, since the New Mexico Capital Felony Sentencing Act
became law in 1979, the government of the State of New Mexico has
not executed anyone under the Act, and only two men now sit on death
row.83 Consequently, it is likely that a high percentage of death sentences
imposed by juries could be overturned as disproportionate. Therefore, a
great waste of judicial resources is possible in each death trial. If the
district court could screen for proportionality, such waste could be pre-
vented.
One positive implication of the court's decision is that by having only
the supreme court perform proportionality reviews, the decisions are likely
to be more uniform . 4 As the court pointed out, the purpose of the
proportionality review is to make sure that the death penalty is not
applied in an arbitrary or capricious manner.85 By having the supreme
court perform all such reviews, the court avoids the different standards
of decision that would inevitably occur to some extent if the many
different district courts were making proportionality determinations.
The implications discussed above may not be sufficient to overcome
the legislative intent that only the supreme court make proportionality
determinations. Nevertheless, they should be taken into account by the
legislature and possibly lead to an amendment to the Capital Sentencing
Act which would allow district courts, as well as the supreme court, to
make proportionality determinations.
VI. CONCLUSION
In State v. Wyrostek, the Supreme Court of New Mexico held that it
was the "sole arbiter of whether or not the death penalty would be
excessive or disproportionate in a given case."18 6 This decision denies the
district courts the jurisdiction to make a proportionality determination
pre-trial or at any point during the trial or sentencing phases. While the
court's analysis of the Capital Felony Sentencing Act and the relevant
policy considerations was correct, the court failed to fully answer the
constitutional questions arising out of the differing grants of jurisdiction.
Until the court more fully explores the constitutional issues, the district
court's constitutional power to make proportionality reviews will remain
in doubt. While the court's decision in Wyrostek makes it more difficult
for a defendant to escape the death penalty and could lead to greater
the defendant's motion to dismiss aggravating circumstances, the district court should conduct a
pretrial evaluation of aggravating circumstances. The district court should grant the motion to
dismiss the aggravating circumstances if the aggravating circumstance does not apply as a matter
of law or if there is not probable cause to support the aggravating circumstance.
83. Defendant-Appellee's Answer Brief at I, State v. Wyrostek, 117 N.M. 514, 873 P.2d 260
(1994) (No. 20.696). In cases where a jury has given the death penalty, the New Mexico Supreme
Court and/or the Governor of New Mexico has either reversed those decisions or granted a pardon
from the death penalty. Id.
84. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 70-71 (1984) (finding that there is no constitutional right
to a proportionality review).
85. Wyrostek, 117 N.M. at 522-23, 873 P.2d at 268-69.
86. Id. at 516, 873 P.2d at 262.
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expenditure of judicial resources, it also ensures that rulings on pro-
portionality will be issued in a uniform, non-capricious manner.
RENEE HARTON
